

# Monetary Policy in the Context of Balance Sheet Adjustments

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Washington DC, 22 May 2013

# Monetary policy response to balance sheet adjustments

- A delicate balancing act:
  - Policy should not stand in the way of a necessary reversal of past excesses
  - At the same time, policy must ensure that the economy does not enter into a downward spiral that would be inconsistent with price stability
- Other authorities must play their role


#### **Outline**

- I. Monetary policy challenges in the context of acute deleveraging pressures
- 2. ECB response and role of other policies
- 3. Flexibility and credibility in the ECB's monetary policy framework


- Swings in asset prices are a matter of concern when facilitated and compounded by trends in debt
- Credit intensity of expansive phase closely associated with severity of recession phase
- Still: leverage cycles are difficult to interpret and to macro-manage

- Deleveraging cycles interact with liquidity cycles in complicated ways:
  - A funding shock in a context of leveraged and maturity mismatched financial system prompts assets liquidation, falls in asset prices which retroact on funding liquidity
  - In presence of bank fragility there may be wild swings in the demand for outside money

- Phases of deleveraging cycle:
  - Surge in demand for outside money is accommodated
  - Deleveraging cycle starts to run its own course
  - Central banks must be vigilant that the pace of asset reduction is commensurate with an evolution of activity that does not create downside risks to price stability




### I. Monetary policy challenges in the context of deleveraging pressures: evolution of Target2 balances in the crisis



Sources: ECB, NCB and IMF data and author's calculations (P. Cour-Thimann, Target balances and the crisis in the euro area, mimeo). Latest observations: end-March 2013.

Note: A positive (negative) sign reflects a net claim (liability) of the national central bank vis-à-vis the ECB in the TARGET2 payment system. Claims and liabilities (including that of the ECB) add up to zero.



Source: ECB. Latest observation: March 2013

### II. Euro area crisis response

- Multidimensional and consistent policy response
- Need for a thorough identification of risks on banks balance sheets and reconstruction of equity
- ECB responds to price stability risks. Will continue employing its existing instruments and if necessary expand its instruments' set within the safeguards established by the Treaty
- Institutional developments are necessary complements to ECB action

### II. Euro area crisis response


#### The price of deflation and inflation protection in the euro area



Sources: Bloomberg. Latest observation: 26 April 13

Note: The market for inflation-linked options is relatively illiquid and often heavily influenced by specific demand and supply patterns. Developments should therefore be interpreted with caution. The underlying instruments are for the inflation protection: year-on-year cap of 4% with 5 year maturity; for deflation protection: year-on-year floor of 0% with 5 year maturity.

# II. Euro area crisis response: impact of VLTROs and OMT in Spain



Source: Thomson Financial Datastream and ECB calculations. Last observtion: 4 March 2013.

### II. Euro area crisis response: improved funding situation of MFIs and the reduction in Eurosystem borrowing


#### Main MFIs' assets in selected euro area countries

(average monthly flows in € billions, seasonally adjusted)

#### ■ Shares and other equities of MFIs ■ Credit to private sector ■ Credit to General Government Claims on Eurosystem External assets Residual assets 40 40 Germany Spain 30 30 20 20 10 10 0 -10 -10 -20 -20 -30 -30 -40 -40 -50 -50

#### Main MFIs' liabilities in selected euro area countries

(average monthly flows in € billions, seasonally adjusted)



Source: ECB. Latest observation: March 2013.

### III. Long-term ECB strategy

### Strategy must be:

- > sufficiently flexible
- >sufficiently binding to anchor expectations

### III. Long-term ECB strategy

#### Flexibility derives from three features:

- The definition of price stability, formulated in terms of range with an explicit focal point for policy
- The definition applies to the medium term. The policy relevant horizon is a choice variable, conditional on the nature of shocks
- Instrumental flexibility

### III. Long-term ECB strategy

#### Credibility is a pre-condition for flexibility

- Confidence that central bank is determined to offset price pressures in line with its mandate mitigates economic fluctuations (inter-temporal substitution in spending due to well-anchored expectations of future policy action)
- The ECB institutional framework, and in particular the monetary financing prohibition, is not simply a constraint on what the ECB can do. It is also a safeguard that reinforces its action and protects its capability to act

Thank you for your attention!